when Appius has been frustrated in his quest, Lucan will call him demens (288). So besides being a coward, this consulter is a fool.4
The oracle Appius has chosen is Delphi, which must be understood to be the representative of the superi dei. Lucan's description of the shrine is confusing in the extreme. Immediately after announcing the visitation, he launches into a solemn epic passage on the mythological and religious significance of this prophetic seat (71-85). H. P. Syndikus thinks that the purpose of the passage is to impress upon the reader the importance and dignity of the oracle.5 The feeling of solemnity, however, is shattered in the next line when the poet turns philosopher and speculates on the identity of the deity resident at Delphi. At line 85 we hear that the prophet is Apollo. (The use of the proper name as the last word of the line is emphatic.) But beginning at line 86, in a jarring shift from epic description to rationalistic speculation, comes a series of questions on the god's identity: "quis latet hic superum? quod numen ... ? quis terram caeli patitur deus ... ?" Unclear also is the deity's relation to fate, and the poet asks whether he determines destiny or simply prophesies it (92-93). Lucan speculates that perhaps a part of the divine element, which he now calls Jove, may be embedded here, occasionally to enter the bosom of the priestess (93-101). Earlier, in a more poetic moment, Lucan had spoken of mephitic exhalation as the source of oracular prophecy: "ut vidit Paean vastos telluris hiatus / divinam spirare fidem ventosque loquaces / exhalare solum" (82-84). So before the actual visitation we hear a number of conflicting theories and questions about the god. It may be Apollo, it may be the all-pervasive deity going under the name of Jove, or it may be some anonymous god whose name and nature are unknowable.6 And as for prophecy, the possibility seems slim, since Delphi is described as closed and silent (69, 120-21). We approach the oracle with a degree of uncertainty and wariness.
Our suspicions, already aroused by the poet's speculative description, are further compounded by the actions of the priestess Phemonoe. Afraid to undergo possession by the god, she refuses to cooperate with Appius or with the priest, who has to push her bodily into the sanctuary. Still she resists and attempts to persuade the consulter that the god is silent. This anomalous situation becomes a ludicrous one when Phemonoe simulates ecstatic communion with Apollo (and a bad job she does of it) in order to deceive Appius, who finally puts a stop to the nonsense by threatening her with death. There follows a detailed description of her frenzy, induced, we are told, by Apollo. Lucan here elucidates in straightforward fashion what the priestess only hinted at. Yes, Appius will find peace and safety, but they will be the peace and safety which come only with the end of life.7
The whole point of Delphi's riddling message to Appius-and this is significant-is death. And this is the import also of Lucan's own predictiondeath for Appius, for Rome, and for a large portion of mankind as well. As far as the war goes, he is insignificant, with no great part to plav. His walk-on role confined to this one scene is indicative of his unimportance. We remember that in her vision Phemonoe had difficulty finding him: "inter fata diu quaerens tam magna latentem" (189). Yet, trivial as he is, he shares the same destiny as those who overshadow him with their greatness. Pompey and Caesar will wage the war and then perish as victims of its violence. Appius will remain uninvolved and die naturally and peacefully in Euboea. Although the storm of war will leave him untouched, still he will not escape physical destruction. Be men great or small, participants in the conflict or spectators, annihilation awaits one and all. And it is the function of the Delphi episode to demonstrate this truth. Since the future holds the same destiny for all mankind, the desire for foreknowledge is misguided and foolish. Only those too blind to see reality, or too cowardly to face it, need consult oracles. Appius is such a man and deserves the poet's scorn. One recalls the words of Seneca: "quam ideo timere dementis est quia certa expectantur, dubia metuuntur. mors necessitatem habet aequam et invictam."9
Lucan's opinion on the worthlessness of foreknowledge is implicit throughout this episode, and elsewhere it is voiced in no uncertain terms. At the opening of Book 2, for example, immediately after a lengthy sequence of ominous prodigies and prophecies, he asks of heaven (4-6, 14-15): Better to live in ignorance of the future and still have some hope.10 It is interesting to observe that while some characters like Appius are too foolish to realize what lies ahead, a great many others instinctively know the future without the aid of oracles or prophecies. As he takes leave of Italy, Pompey knows in his heart that he will never see his country again (3. 5-6). His wife Cornelia is aware of the disaster at Pharsalus even before she meets her spouse (8. 41-49). As the Pompeian party approaches Egypt, the companions of Magnus all have premonitions of what will happen: "non ulli comitum sceleris praesagia derant" (8. 571). The character with the clearest vision of the future is Cato, who long before the battle of Pharsalus knows that the republic will die, that tyranny is inevitable, and that neither he nor liberty will survive one another (2. 297-318).
It should be noted also that Lucan depends on the reader's own foreknowledge in order to create a feeling of impending doom. For like the Aeneid, the Pharsalia contains predictions of actual historical events. But 9. Ep. 30. 10-11.while Vergil's epic prophesies the birth of Rome and Golden Age of Augustus, Lucan's foresees only its death and enslavement under the Caesars. By taking past and present events and predicting them as if they lay in the future, Vergil conveys a sense of grand destiny unfolding in the history of Rome. Lucan does something very similar; only, by predicting the downfall of the republic and the emergence of a tyranny, he achieves the opposite effect. In the Pharsalia almost every person and every event is overshadowed by disaster or death. Syndikus makes the observation that Lucan, in structuring his scenes, never builds to a climax created by a sudden reversal of fortune. He adduces the Curio episode, which had a cloud of gloom over it from the beginning, long before the disastrous ending." Even the narration of the Pompeian victory at Dyrrhachium is darkened by the shadow of Pharsalus.'2 If foreknowledge is superfluous, then oracles are useless. And Delphi is worse than useless because it veils even the simple certitude of death in obscurity in order to frustrate foolish mortals like Appius. It is clear that Lucan has intentionally portrayed the oracle as ambiguous and unworthy of belief. The inconsistent mixture of mythology and rationalism purposely contributes to a feeling of confusion and suspicion. All this is meant to reflect badly upon the superi dei, who have determined to destroy mankind and subject the world to threatening portents Rightly does Lucan call them superi minaces (1. 524).
Although the episode of Appius at Delphi may be actionless and bear little relation to the "plot," it is nonetheless a rich and carefully constructed scene. In it converge a number of important themes: the futility of foreknowledge, the inefficacy of divination, the malevolence of the superi, and the certitude of death. It might also be added that Lucan has appropriately sketched Appius as a fitting consulter of Apollo's riddling oracle. Yet strangely enough, scholars have not appreciated the episode in its own right and have regarded it as mere foreshadowing at best. W. E. Heitland dismisses it as "padding"-presumably because it centers on an insignificant character who appears only once and because it does little to advance the action toward Pharsalus.'3 Syndikus calls the characterization of Appius unimportant.'4 0. Schrempp thinks that everything in the scene before Lucan's own reflection at line 198 is of little relation to the main theme,'5 while M. P. 0. Morford considers the whole story a trite excursus.'6 Failure to appreciate this episode for its own sake results either from overemphasizing the "plot" of the civil war, or from exaggerating the importance of the battle of Pharsalus. The fact is, many scenes only marginally connected to the central action are carriers of important themes. He refuses to consult Delos, Delphi, and Dodona, and rejects extispicy, haruspicy, and astrology on the grounds that the superi know nothing. And from what we saw of Apollo's performance at Delphi, we must admit that he is correct. He believes that superior knowledge lies with Thessalian witches and with Erichtho most of all. Sextus' preference for this "oracle" over a more conventional one signals a contest between Apollo and the sorceress.
Thessalian necromancy is worlds removed from the prophecy of Pythian Delphi. But is it more efficacious? Does this witch have any more power or certitude than the oracle of Delphi? And if she does, will she reveal it more clearly? The answer to all these questions is an unqualified yes.
Lucan's preliminary description of Erichtho's abode and its environs stands in stark contrast to his introduction to Delphi. Nowhere is there intentional inconsistency or rationalistic speculation to cast doubt on the power of black magic. The description begins with Thessaly itself, source and site of many evils (333-412), then moves on to an account of the magic practiced there (434-506), and climaxes in the portrait of Erichtho, the necrophagous witch, whose doings are recounted with no effort to spare the squeamish (507-569).'7 Every detail in the introduction to the prophecy is designed to create a sense of the overwhelming potency of necromancy.
Two points in these passages are striking: first, the great emphasis on death; second, the total superiority of the inferi dei over the superi. Everything about Erichtho-her spells, rituals, and rites-is directed toward inflicting death. Not only does she lord it over humanity, but she even subjects heaven to her whims (443-47) . Human emotions (454-55) He has questions to ask about this oracle as he did about Delphi. But these questions cast no doubt upon the efficacy of witchcraft. Rather, they confirm the feeling that Erichtho's magic is infinitely more potent than anything the traditional oracles could offer. We are invited to conclude that the realm of hell has usurped the prerogatives of heaven and assumed control of the universe. It is interesting to note that this inversion occurred as early as Book 1, when Arruns, after performing a rite of extispicy, cried out (631-34): vix fas, superi, quaecumque movetis, prodere me populis; nec enim tibi, summe, litavi, luppiter, hoc sacrum, caesique in pectora tauri inferni venere dei.
Arruns' suspicion that the inferi dei hold sway over the superi is confirmed beyond all doubt by Erichtho.
Sextus' purpose in searching out the witch is to learn the future. Specifically, he wants to know who will die: "quos petat e nobis, Mortem mihi coge fateri" (601). Too foolish to realize that this question needs no answering, he comes to the very realm of death to have it spelled out. And in contrast to Appius he is not frustrated. For the sorceress, in an amazing display of power over life and death, raises up a cadaver and bids it prophesy. Notice that there is no equivocation, no unwillingness as on the part of Phemonoe. This soothsayer has sure and certain knowledge of the future and will gladly impart it. In her command to the corpse she casts aspersions on the oracles of the superi, and her reference to the tripod is a direct attack on Delphian Apollo (770-73): tripodas vatesque deorum sors obscura decet: certus discedat, ab umbris quisquis vera petit duraeque oracula mortis fortis adit.
The upper gods may mock their consulters with riddles, but the oracles of death will dispense truth without hesitation to those with the courage to approach them. Accordingly, Erichtho orders the resurrected body to give all the particulars: "da nomina rebus, / da loca: da vocem qua mecum fata loquantur" (773-74). In one respect the two oracles complement each other; in another they contrast, that is, in their certitude. As we saw, and as Erichtho claimed, the oracles of the upper gods deal only in enigmas. Apollo's message is death, but he conceals that truth in obscurity. At the oracula mortis the message is the same, but with the difference that it is clear and unequivocal. The point is thus unmistakable: certitude lies not with the upper gods or in the land of the living, but with the infernal deities, that is, in death!"9
The third and final oracle of the Pharsalia is that of Jupiter Hammon, which Cato goes out of his way to visit in the course of the desert march (9. 511-86).20 It contains, as Morford says, "Lucan's mature views on divination."'" As in the two previous scenes, we must consider the character of the man and the nature of the prophetic seat.
The subject of Cato's personality need not detain us long. Suffice it to say that he is a good and holy man, the stoic sapiens, the virtutum viva imago.22 The situation is unique because for the first time a man who encounters an oracle is neither fool nor coward. And it should be remembered that from the moment of his first appearance in Book 2 Cato displays a heroic attitude toward death, entertaining no delusion either about his own fate or about the fate of Rome.
As for Jupiter Hammon, Lucan depicts him favorably. This is unusual for a poet who shows himself elsewhere either as rationalist or contemptor divum. He refers sympathetically to the oracle's great reputation and adduces a number of details attesting to the real presence and integrity of the god. Hammon's poverty contrasts with the riches of Roman temples (519-21); the trees and oasis testify that the god does indeed reside here (522-27); and finally the wealth of astronomical detail lends weight and importance to the temple's celebrated oracular powers (528-44). In contrast to Delphi, Hammon arouses no suspicion or rationalistic questioning; and in contrast to Erichtho, there is nothing distasteful or repellent in the appearance of the god. Here at last is an oracle commanding the respectability of Delphi as well as the efficacy and credibility of Erichtho. Worthy also, as Labienus insists, is the man standing at the door of the temple.
Cato, however, is no Appius and certainly no Sextus. Requested to inquire into the death of Caesar and the fate of the republic, he refuses and 
